The ability to produce random numbers that are unknown to any outside party is crucial for many applications. Device-independent randomness generation (DIRNG) [1] [2] [3] [4] allows new randomness to be provably generated, without needing to trust the devices used for the protocol. This provides strong guarantees about the security of the output, but comes at the price of requiring the violation of a Bell inequality to implement. A further challenge is to make the bounds in the security proofs tight enough to allow expansion with contemporary technology. Thus, while randomness has been generated in recent experiments [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , the amount of randomness consumed in doing so has been too high to certify expansion based on existing theory. Here we present an experiment that demonstrates device-independent randomness expansion (DIRNE)[1-3, 10-15], i.e., where the generated randomness surpasses that consumed. By developing a loopholefree Bell test [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] setup with a single photon detection efficiency of around 81% and exploiting a spot-checking protocol, we achieve a net gain of 2.63 × 10 8 certified bits with soundness error 5.74 × 10 −8 . The experiment ran for 220 hours corresponding to an average rate of randomness generation of 8202 bits/s. By developing the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) [4, 21, 22] , we established security against quantum adversaries. We anticipate that this work will lead to further improvements that push device-independence towards commercial viability.
The ability to produce random numbers that are unknown to any outside party is crucial for many applications. Device-independent randomness generation (DIRNG) [1] [2] [3] [4] allows new randomness to be provably generated, without needing to trust the devices used for the protocol. This provides strong guarantees about the security of the output, but comes at the price of requiring the violation of a Bell inequality to implement. A further challenge is to make the bounds in the security proofs tight enough to allow expansion with contemporary technology. Thus, while randomness has been generated in recent experiments [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , the amount of randomness consumed in doing so has been too high to certify expansion based on existing theory. Here we present an experiment that demonstrates device-independent randomness expansion (DIRNE) [1] [2] [3] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , i.e., where the generated randomness surpasses that consumed. By developing a loopholefree Bell test [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] setup with a single photon detection efficiency of around 81% and exploiting a spot-checking protocol, we achieve a net gain of 2.63 × 10 8 certified bits with soundness error 5.74 × 10 −8 . The experiment ran for 220 hours corresponding to an average rate of randomness generation of 8202 bits/s. By developing the Entropy Accumulation Theorem (EAT) [4, 21, 22] , we established security against quantum adversaries. We anticipate that this work will lead to further improvements that push device-independence towards commercial viability.
According to quantum theory, measurement outcomes are in general unpredictable, even to observers possessing quantum devices. Quantum processes have hence been extensively studied as a source of randomness [23, 24] . In a typical quantum random number generator, the user relies on the device work-ing in a particular way, for instance, by having single photons pass through a 50:50 beam splitter and being detected. Deviations in the device-behaviour affect the randomness of the outputs, while being difficult to detect. Furthermore, any real device will be too complicated to model in its entirety, leaving open the possibility that an adversary can exploit a feature of the device outside the model, as has been seen in QKD [25] . To circumvent this, device independent protocols were introduced, which are proven secure without any assumptions about the devices used. This leads to a significantly higher level of security by removing any problems caused by unmodelled features.
Recently we have witnessed significant advances in experimental device-independent randomness generation. Some previous protocols require additional assumptions [3, [5] [6] [7] , and even the most advanced to date [8, 9] consumed more randomness than they generated. Hence, randomness expansion, which is a quantum feature without classical counterpart, remained elusive and technically challenging. For example, with our previous experimental setup [8] , almost 110,000 experimental hours would be required to achieve randomness expansion with the protocol presented below, putting it out of reach in practice.
Here we report the experimental realization of device-independent randomness expansion with high statistical confidence, the success of which is based on substantial improvements at both theoretical and experimental sides. We theoretically derive a tighter bound on entropy accumulation in the randomness generation process and construct a photonic entanglement platform to realize loophole-free violation of the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [26] inequality with a record-high violation. We remark that the significance of this work is twofold in that it advances both our understanding of randomness and our experimental quantum optical capabilities. Such improvements take us a step closer to being able to realize a number of other critical quantum arXiv:1912.11159v1 [quant-ph] 24 Dec 2019 information tasks such as device-independent quantum key distribution [27] .
The entropy accumulation theorem (EAT) [4, 21, 22] provides relatively tight bounds on the amount of randomness that can be extracted against an adversary limited only by quantum theory. Roughly speaking, the EAT shows that in an n-round protocol achieving a CHSH game score of ω, the amount of output randomness is lower bounded by
where h(ω) is the worst-case von Neumann entropy of an individual round of the protocol with expected score ω. The score on round i is 1 2 (1 + (−1) Ai⊕Bi⊕(Xi·Yi) ), where A i and B i are measurement outcomes and X i and Y i are measurement setting choices at the two sites, with A i , B i , X i and Y i ∈ {0, 1} (see Fig. 1 ), and v is a correction factor accounting for the finite statistics. Using ideas from the improved EAT [22] , we derive a tighter lower bound on the accumulated entropy, (see the Methods). This allows us to use a spot-checking protocol to experimentally realize randomness expansion with a state-of-art experimental quantum optical technique. Fig. 1 shows a conceptual drawing of our spotchecking device-independent protocol, where the assumptions are outlined. The underlying idea is to check that devices situated in a secure lab violate a Bell inequality, hence it is important to ensure that the devices at both sites (labelled Alice and Bob) cannot signal to one another or to the outside of the lab. If a Bell inequality is violated while satisfying our assumptions, then the devices must be generating randomness, even relative to an adversary who may share entanglement with the devices. The generated randomness can be extracted by appropriate post-processing. In this protocol (Box 1), the initial randomness is required to decide whether a round is a test round, T i = 1 (with probability γ), or a generation round, T i = 0 (with probability 1 − γ). T i is then communicated to two separate sites (but not to the measurement devices). In a test round, an independent uniform random number generator at each site generates the input to each device to perform the CHSH game; this event is made spacelike to the output of the device at the other site so that Bob's output, B i , cannot depend on Alice's input, X i , and likewise Alice's output, A i , cannot depend on Bob's input, Y i . A test round consumes 2 bits of randomness. In a generation round, the devices at the two sites are given the input "0". Crucially, each measurement device only learns its own input and not whether a round was a test or generation round. . The protocol takes place in a secure lab, which is shielded from direct communication to the outside. The lab contains two black-box devices which accept inputs and yield outputs from the binary alphabet {0, 1} and these can be shielded from communicating at will. In particular, we assume the user can completely control the flow of classical communication in and out of these regions (indicated by the dashed lines). In our experiment, the secure lab contains two sites Alice and Bob. They share a pair of entangled particles which may be distributed from a central station. (If we had good enough quantum storage, then all entanglement could be pre-shared.) Alice and Bob's respective inputs are Xi and Yi and their outputs Ai and Bi. The user also possesses a trusted classical computer (with which to process the classical data) and sources of initial randomness. In our experiment the initial randomness is depicted by an extractor seed R and three RNGs that determine the inputs to the devices. These output either 0 or 1, where the number in the box (γ or 1/2) denotes the probability of 1. The central RNG determines the round-type and the peripheral ones determine the inputs if a test round is chosen.
We implement the protocol on a quantum optical platform (see Fig. 2 ). Pairs of polarizationentangled photons at the wavelength of 1560 nm are generated via spontaneous parametric downconversion at the central station and are delivered to two remote sites, where polarization-dependent measurements are conducted. Previously this platform proved to be robust enough to realize loophole free violation of a Bell inequality and DIRNG, in which the CHSH game scores ω violated the classical bound Box 1 : CHSH-based DIRNE Protocol Arguments: n ∈ N -number of rounds played γ ∈ (0, 1] -expected fraction of test rounds ωexp -expected CHSH score given a test round δ ∈ (0, 1) -width of the statistical confidence interval for the CHSH score R -A random seed for the extractor Protocol:
1. For every round i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do 2 − 4. 2. Set Ui =⊥. Choose Ti ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr(Ti = 1) = γ.
3. If Ti = 0 use the devices with inputs (Xi, Yi) = (0, 0), record Ai, replace Bi with 0 and set Ui = 0. 4. If Ti = 1, choose the inputs Xi and Yi uniformly at random from {0, 1} and record Ai and Bi and set
, then abort the protocol. 6. Apply a strong quantum-proof randomness extractor to get output randomness M = Ext(AB, R).
(Because we use a strong extractor M can be concatenated with R to give Z = (M, R).) ω class = 0.75 by 0.00027 [8] . Under these conditions and using the same error parameters as elsewhere in this paper, it would take about 8.62 × 10 13 rounds of the experiment to witness randomness expansion according to our revised EAT theory (open square in Fig. 3 ). To go beyond this, in the present work, we achieved record-high single-photon detection efficiencies of 80.41 ± 0.34% for Alice and 82.24 ± 0.32% for Bob, ensuring the detection loophole is closed in the CHSH game. Following the spot-checking protocol, a biased quantum random number generator (QRNG) is used to decide whether to test or not. Its output T i is transmitted to Alice and Bob to determine whether to use the local unbiased QRNGs in each round. When T i = 1, the setting choices A i and B i are randomly determined, while when T i = 0, the local unbiased QRNGs are turned off and fixed measurements are made.
Before the start of the main experiment, a systematic experimental calibration is implemented to predetermine several parameters mentioned in the protocol, which yields a CHSH game score of 0.750809. We find that for γ = 1.008 × 10 −4 , corresponding to an average input entropy rate of 0.0017 bits per round, we would expect to witness randomness expansion with a soundness error (see the Methods) of 5.74 × 10 −8 after at least 2.91 × 10 12 rounds (open circle in Fig. 3 ), i.e., the randomness produced in the experiment surpasses the consumed entropy after this number of rounds (see the Supplementary Information, Section III.A). The experimental time taken to get expansion is about 600 times shorter than with the previous performance of our platform [8] .
In the main experiment, we set ω exp = 0.750809, δ = 2.1 × 10 −4 , and conservatively set the number of rounds to n = 3.168 × 10 12 , which is slightly larger than the 2.98 × 10 12 rounds required. This is computed with our optimization algorithm for γ = 1.194 × 10 −4 (see the Supplementary Information, Section III.A). We complete all the rounds of the experiment in 220 hours at a repetition rate of 4 MHz. The resulting CHSH game score is ω CHSH = 0.750805. The difference between ω CHSH and ω exp is smaller than δ, which is consistent with the value we expect (and means that the protocol does not abort). The raw experimental output has size 3.168Tb. According to the development of the EAT presented in the Supplementary Information, it contains at least 6.496 × 10 9 quantum-certified bits of randomness, exceeding the amount of entropy (6.233 × 10 9 bits) required for its generation (see the inset in Fig. 4 and the Methods). We perform a Toeplitz matrix (6.496Gb × 3.168Tb) multiplication to extract the quantum-certified random bits from the raw output. The soundness error of the final output is 5.74 × 10 −8 . Crucially, since a quantum-proof strong extractor is applied, the seed required for the extraction remains random after its use and hence is not considered as entropy consumed [28] . (Technically, the seed degrades by a very small, which is accounted for in the soundness error given above; see the Supplementary Information, Section I.C). Overall we achieve DIRNE, gaining 2.63 × 10 8 net bits with a net rate of 8.32 × 10 −5 bits per round against an eavesdropper limited by quantum theory (shown by the open circle in Fig. 4 ).
When playing the CHSH game in the test rounds we close both the detection and locality loopholes, although closing the latter is not absolutely necessary given our assumption that we can shield the [8] . The two photons of an entangled pair at 1560 nm travel in opposite directions to two remote sites Alice and Bob, where they are subject to polarization projection measurements. b) Single photon polarization measurement: In the measurement sites, Alice (Bob) uses a Pockels cell to project the single photon into one of two pre-determined measurement bases, and then detects single photons with a superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD). A time-digital convertor (TDC) is used to time-tag the events for random number generation and single-photon detection. In each round, a biased QRNG in the lab creates a random bit Ti with probability distribution (γ, 1 − γ) to determine in advance whether this round will be a test or generation round. In test rounds Alice and Bob each receive a random bit "0" or "1" from a local quantum random number generator (QRNG) to set Pockels cell to zero and half-wave voltage accordingly (in generation rounds they always use zero).
devices (see the Supplementary Information, Section I.B). We also remark that the randomness we generate is secure according to a composable security definition (see the Methods) and hence can be used in any application requiring random numbers. Strictly, because of an issue with the composability of device independent protocols [29] , without further assumption, ongoing security of the output randomness relies on the devices not being reused.
Going beyond the work here we would like protocols that have an improved rate. Robust protocols that achieve up to two bits of randomness per entangled qubit pair are known [15] . However, to experimentally use such protocols to gain an advantage requires a significant improvement in the detection efficiency, which is difficult to achieve with a photonic setup. On the theory side, better rates could be achieved by developing tighter bounds on the output randomness. It would also be interesting to put into practice a protocol for randomness amplification [30] , hence reducing the assumption on the input randomness. Definition 1 (security). A protocol with an output Z is called ( S , C )-secure if it satisfies 1. (Soundness) For an implementation of the protocol that produces m bits of output we have
where τ m represents a completely mixed state on m qubits, E represents all systems that could be held by an adversary (Eve), Ω the event that the protocol does not abort, p Ω the probability of this occurring. · 1 is the trace norm.
(Completeness)
There exists an honest implementation such that p Ω ≥ 1 − C .
The soundness error bounds the distance between the output of the protocol and that of an idealized protocol where Eve's marginal is the same as in the real protocol, but the output is perfectly uniform and independent of Eve.
In general, the raw output of a protocol can have a lot of randomness, while being easily distinguishable from uniform. However, by applying an appropriate randomness extractor, which is a classical function taking a random seed and the raw output, an almost uniform output can be recovered. The length of this output can be taken to be roughly equal to the smooth min-entropy of the raw string conditioned on the side information held by Eve [34, 35] . 
where the outer maximisation is over the set B h (ρ AE ) of all sub-normalized statesρ AE = ap (a) |a a| ⊗ρ a E within purified distance [36] h of ρ AE . Note that max {Πa} ap (a)Tr(Π aρa E ) can be interpreted as the maximum probability of guessing A given access to the system E.
The interpretation in terms of guessing probability makes clear that this quantity is a measure of unpredictability. Bounding the smooth min-entropy for a device-independent protocol is challenging. We do this by means of the entropy accumulation theorem and state an informal version that is applicable to the CHSH game below.
B. Theoretical details about the protocol
In the protocol, the user has two devices which are prevented from communicating with one another and with which the CHSH game can be played. To do so each device is supplied with a uniformly chosen inputs denoted by X, Y ∈ {0, 1}, and each produces an output, denoted A, B ∈ {0, 1} respectively. The CHSH game is scored according to the function 1 2 (1+ (−1) A⊕B⊕(X·Y ) ). In other words, the game is won (with a score of 1) if A ⊕ B = X · Y and is lost (with a score of 0) otherwise.
At the end of the protocol the number of rounds in which the CHSH game was won is counted and compared to nγ(ω exp − δ). The challenge in a randomness expansion protocol is to go from this to the amount of extractable randomness. For this we use the EAT, which we state informally here (note that the version we use is a development of Ref. 22 ; for more details, see the Supplementary Information).
Theorem 1 (Entropy accumulation, informal).
Suppose the protocol of Box 1 is performed and that devices are such that p Ω is the probability that the protocol does not abort. Let α ∈ (1, 2), h ∈ (0, 1) and f (s) be an affine lower bound on the singleround von Neumann entropy for any strategy achieving an expected score of s. If the protocol does not abort, we can assume
where ω = ω exp − δ and the explicit forms of the functions V (f, γ, ω) and K α (f, γ) can be found in the Supplementary Information.
By setting α − 1 ∝ 1 √ n , the subtracted terms scale as √ n whereas the leading rate term scales with n, leading to the relation in Eqn. (1) when f (ω) is a good approximation to h(ω), the worst-case von Neumann entropy for the observed score.
In order to produce the output string M, we apply a strong quantum-proof randomness extractor. The reason we use a strong extractor is that the random seed, R, required for the extractor remains random even conditioned on the extractor's output and is hence not consumed. This means that M can be concatenated with the extractor seed R to give output Z = (M, R). We discuss the extraction in more detail in the Supplementary Information. Importantly, the length of the output (excluding the recycled seed), will be roughly rand out ≈ H h min (AB|E). We need this to be greater than the randomness consumed.
Remark 1 (Input randomness). The expected input randomness, rand in of the protocol in Box 1 is
where H bin denotes the binary Shannon entropy. The contribution H bin (γ) comes from the selection of the test rounds and 2γ from the selection of the input bits for the CHSH game. The interval algorithm [37] can be used to turn uniform random bits to biased ones at the claimed rate.
We do not include the randomness necessary for seeding the extractor in the above because it is not consumed, although it is needed to run the protocol.
Suppose that a protocol has some fixed expected score ω exp . To demonstrate randomness expansion, i.e., rand out − rand in > 0, at this performance we have to choose the parameters n and γ appropriately. Increasing n leads to an improvement in the rate, but takes longer and increases the experimental difficulty. The tradeoff with γ appears in the rand out and rand in terms. The input randomness evidently decreases as γ shrinks, which is favourable since this term is subtracted. However, the minentropy also decreases because the error term scales roughly as 1 √ γ [22] . Moreover, the statistical confidence decreases with less frequent testing and as such the threshold score for successful parameter estimation must be lowered (i.e., δ increased) in order to obtain a small completeness error. This also has a negative impact on the randomness produced. We outline how to calculate the completeness error in the Supplementary Information.
Appendix A: Theory of Device-Independent Quantum Randomness Expansion
Notation
We summarize the main notation used in the paper and the supplementary information. We use log for the logarithm base 2 and ln for the natural logarithm. The function sign(x) := x |x| for x ∈ R is the sign function with sign(0) = 0. We generally denote states by lower case Greek letters, such as ρ and σ. These will often be subscripted by capital Latin letters denoting the Hilbert spaces upon which the state acts, such as a state ρ ABE denoting a state on Alice, Bob and Eve's joint system, although when clear from context the system subscripts may be omitted. We denote the set of states for a Hilbert space A by S(A). We consider classical-quantum (CQ) states, which take the form
The classical system, or register, A contains the letters, a, of some alphabet, A. The quantum system E carries states ρ (a) E where the bracketed superscript indicates the value of the classical system upon which the state depends.
We account for multiple rounds by encoding the result of each round to a different system. We use a subscript, e.g., A i to denote Alice's system for round i. We denote quantum channels by calligraphic letters, such as M i , which we also subscript with the round-number to which the channel relates when appropriate. When a channel is defined on some system A, we extend it to composite systems implicitly, hence M(ρ AR ) = M ⊗ I R (ρ AR ), where I R is the identity channel on the R system. When there are n systems in total, we will sometimes use the bold face [A] = A 1 . . . A n , and likewise for values on these n systems. Hence, |[a] [a]| [A] = |a 1 a 1 | A1 ⊗· · ·⊗|a n a n | An . We also use capital letters to refer to the random variables on the classical registers of CQ states. We use slightly different notation from the main body to refer to the inputs and outputs for the EAT. In the main body, we have chosen notation which is consistent with the usual notation for cryptography, A and B denote outputs for each device and X and Y inputs. Here, however, we choose for our notation to be consistent with that of [21, 22] for readability since we adapt their proof. To translate from the Supplementary Information to the main body, we can make the substitutions A → AB, B → XY and U → X, i.e., A is now the register containing the joint outputs, B is the register containing the joint inputs and X is the register containing the test scores.
Protocol Assumptions
We recall the assumptions necessary for randomness expansion (see e.g. [1] ):
1. The user has a secure laboratory and can prevent any devices from receiving or sending communication at will.
2. The user possesses a trusted classical computer.
3. The user has some initial trusted randomness.
4. Quantum theory is correct and complete (see [38, 39] for a connection between the two).
The first assumption is necessary to prevent the devices from communicating directly to an adversary, which would trivially compromise security. We also use it to ensure that the devices do not learn whether a particular round is a test round or not (if they could learn this, they could behave honestly only on test rounds, which could violate the security). Moreover, to genuinely violate a Bell inequality the devices must not be able to communicate their inputs to each other before producing their outputs. In our experiment, this last assumption is ensured because we have spacelike separation. The second assumption is required for correct data processing. In the extreme case, an untrusted computer could simply substitute the real key with a compromised one. It may seem unreasonable to allow trust in classical computers but not in quantum devices, but classical computations are repeatable, so trust in them can be gained by repeating a calculation on different computers.
The third assumption is needed because the inputs to the devices must be random in order to reliably test that a Bell inequality is violated and randomness is also required to seed the extractor. The final assumption constrains the devices and the adversary to operate according to quantum mechanics, and is needed for the theoretical arguments to work. The initial randomness is often thought of as a pre-existing seed. In our experiment for convenience RNGs were used to produce the inputs to the devices. Although we have used RNGs in the protocol, the key point is that more randomness is generated than is used. At the same time we have demonstrated a Bell inequality violation on the test rounds while closing the detection and locality loopholes.
Because of Assumption 1, it is not strictly necessary to close the locality loophole in our experiment. The important thing is to ensure that, before giving its output, each device only learns its own input and not that of the other device. We can ensure this by shielding the devices. (This is sufficient because the aim of the present experiment is not to disprove local realism.) Since we have chosen to implement a spot-checking protocol, we do not have full space-like separation over all rounds since the selection of a generation round is jointly communicated to the device locations by way of a central QRNG. The shielding assumption is hence necessary to ensure that the devices do not alter their behaviour between generation rounds and test rounds. More fundamentally, thinking of randomness expansion as a process that extends a pre-existing seed requires that this seed be shielded from the devices, a task which is not connected to their space-like separation.
Extraction
Given a bound on the min-entropy, a seeded extractor is a deterministic function which takes as arguments the output string and a random seed and produces a string that is almost indistinguishable from uniform.
Definition 3 (Strong extractor [28, 40, 41] ). A function Ext :
where τ d is the maximally mixed state of dimension d.
A quantum-proof (k, EXT )-strong extractor thus provides m bits of randomness (except with probability EXT ) given a guarantee of k bits of min-entropy in X. Extractors can also use the smooth min-entropy instead, which often leads to more randomness (the smooth min-entropy can be much larger than the minentropy) in the output with a relatively small penalty in the error term.
The crucial feature in each of these definitions is that they involve the state ρ Ext(X,Y )Y E as opposed to ρ Ext(X,Y )E . This is what makes them strong extractors: we prove that the seed randomness Y remains random and is uncorrelated with the extractor output and any information held by an adversary (to within distance EXT + 2 h ). This is why the seed is not considered to be consumed in the process.
In this work we use Toeplitz matrices for the extraction, a procedure that was also followed in [8] (see also [42] ). A Toeplitz matrix T is one for which T i,j = T i+1,j+1 whenever both elements exist. Thus, to choose a random Toeplitz matrix we can randomly choose the first row and column, from which all other entries are fixed. The set of all binary Toeplitz matrices form a set of two-universal hash functions [43, 44] , and hence can be used as quantum-proof (k, EXT )-strong randomness extractors with EXT = 2 −(k−m)/2 [34] . Given a raw string of length n with min-entropy k, we can use a randomly chosen m × n binary Toeplitz matrix T to extract the randomness by multiplication with the raw string modulo 2. Given that EXT drops exponentially in k − m one can ensure a small error without sacrificing much in the size of the output.
In our case this theoretically simple computation runs into difficulty due to the size of the data considered. To reduce the computational requirements we perform several simplifications that reduce the problem size and increase its efficiency.
Firstly, in the protocol we replace Bob's output, B i , with 0 in the generation rounds. This means that none of the entropy accumulated during the protocol is contained within the outputs recorded by Bob during the generation rounds and so we do not need to include these in our extraction. The extraction from AB can be performed instead as an extraction from the binary string v = [AB] test , where [B] test is the string of outputs recorded by Bob during test rounds. By removing the outputs of Bob in the generation rounds the input to the extractor is roughly half of its original size, making the computation easier.
After this initial simplification we are left with the problem of multiplying an m × n = (6.496 × 10 9 ) × (3.17 × 10 12 ) Toeplitz matrix T to the raw data vector v with a length n = 3.17 × 10 12 yielding our extracted randomness M = T v of approximately 6.496 × 10 9 bits. To reduce the memory requirements we split this matrix-vector multiplication into several smaller matrix-vector multiplications. For some l ≤ m we can split T into n/l blocks of size m × l, each comprising l columns, i.e., T = (T 1 T 2 . . . T n/l ) where T 1 is the matrix consisting of the first l columns of T , T 2 is the matrix consisting of the second l columns and so on.
[45] Splitting v = (v 1 v 2 . . . v n/l ) also into blocks of the same length l we can rewrite the original matrix vector multiplication as
where ⊕ denotes elementwise addition modulo 2. In our case we split the problem into 1618 blocks. Evaluating T i v i requires an m × l matrix-vector multiplication where m = 6.496 × 10 9 and l = 1.959 × 10 9 . By exploiting the structure of Toeplitz matrices we can use fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) to reduce the time complexity of this operation from O(m 2 ) to O(m log m) [46] . For completeness we now detail the FFT based algorithm.
An m × n Toeplitz matrix takes the form
and so is uniquely specified by the vector a = (a −(n−1) , a −(n−2) , . . . , a m−1 ). Consider the vector b = (v 0 m ) which is the vector v appended with m zeros. Then, the matrix-vector product T v may be computed using the identity
where c n−1 is some n − 1 dimensional vector, F denotes the discrete Fourier transform, F −1 denotes its inverse and denotes the elementwise (Hadamard) product of vectors. Equation (A3) can be derived by noting that the circular convolution of the two vectors a and b gives a b = (c n−1 T v) and furthermore, the Fourier convolution theorem states that a b = F −1 (F(a) F(b)). Finally, noting that each of the blocked matrices T i is itself a Toeplitz matrix we can perform the FFT technique to speed up each of the T i v i computations individually.
To implement the extraction procedure we utilized the Viking research cluster and the FFTs were implemented using the Fftw3 package [47] . The total computation time was around 249 hours, split across 32 cores and required around 400GB of memory. [48] In summary, by applying a quantum-proof strong extractor (Toeplitz hashing) to the output bit-string (3.17 × 10 12 bits) we obtained a shorter bit-string (6.496 × 10 9 bits) which is almost indistinguishable from uniform randomness. Finally, the seed of the extractor a, which in our implementation has size m + n − 1 bits, is not expended by the protocol (this is a condition for a strong extractor), and can thus be reused for some other purpose. Alternatively, a public (but trusted) source of randomness can be used without compromising security (provided it is unknown to the devices before the protocol is run).
Remark 2. We chose to use Toeplitz hashing for the extraction because it was efficient enough to implement on our large output data. In principle, other extractors that require shorter seeds would be desirable to use instead, such as Trevisan's extractor [41, 49] .
Error parameters
Various error parameters feature in the security statements of device-independent randomness expansion. In this section we reprise the discussion of some of the parameters introduced in the main body of the text, starting with a calculation of the completeness error. We use the following theorem which gives tight bounds for the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the binomial distribution.
Theorem 2 ( [50, 51] ). Let n ∈ N, p ∈ (0, 1) and let X be a random variable distributed according to X ∼ Binomial(n, p). Then, for every k = 0, . . . , n − 1 we have
We call an implementation of our DIRNE protocol honest if on each round, the state shared between Alice and Bob and the measurements performed for their respective inputs remain the same. In particular, this implies that the CHSH score for each test round is distributed in an i.i.d. manner. We can use Theorem 2 to upper-bound the completeness error of an honest implementation of the protocol.
Corollary 1 (Completeness error).
Let ω exp be the expected CHSH score achieved by some honest implementation of Protocol DIRNE. Then, the probability that the protocol aborts is no larger than
where δ > 0 is the selected confidence threshold. In particular, this means the completeness error for the protocol is C is no larger than (A4).
Proof. For an honest implementation of the protocol the score registers X i are distributed according to
for each i = 1, . . . , n. Recall that the protocol aborts when |{X i : X i = 1}| < nγ(ω exp − δ). The quantity R = |{X i : X i = 1}| is a random variable following the binomial distribution Binomial(n, γω exp ). Applying Theorem 2, we find the probability that the protocol aborts is upper bounded as
The second parameter in the security definitions of randomness expansion is the soundness error S . Following [15] , we may bound the soundness error of our randomness expansion protocol as
The first term EAT , which we refer to as the device-independent error, is roughly our tolerance of encountering 'lucky' adversaries. In Theorem 3 we see that the error terms depend explicitly on the probability, p Ω , that the protocol does not abort. Since we work in the device-independent setting we cannot assume to know the value of p Ω (this can be set by the adversary). Instead, we can replace p Ω with EAT in the error terms and consider the two possible scenarios. If p Ω ≥ EAT then by making the replacement p Ω → EAT the error terms only increase and we have genuine lower bound on the accumulated entropy. Otherwise, we have p Ω ≤ EAT . However, the chances that the protocol passes but the entropy bound is not valid is less than EAT which can be chosen to be negligibly small. In summary, either the protocol aborts with probability greater than 1 − EAT or Theorem 3 with p Ω → EAT gives a valid lower bound on the entropy we produce. The second term comes from the result of applying a strong extractor to the raw output of our experiment (cf. Lemma 1). It consists of the smoothing parameter h and the extractor error EXT . The extractor error has far less impact on our results than the smoothing error and for our calculations we choose to set EXT = 10 −5 S . The smoothing parameter, h , plays a more prominent role in both the soundness error and the lower bound on quantity of certifiable smooth min-entropy (cf. Theorem 3). By reducing the smoothing parameter we may decrease the soundness error at the expense of smaller bound on the entropy certified by the entropy accumulation theorem. This relationship is the same for the device-independent error. To simplify our calculations we set EAT = EXT + 2 h .
Entropies
In the entropy accumulation theorem, a lower bound on the min-entropy is obtained by way of the αentropy. In this work, we take α ∈ (1, 2], although some definitions and identities hold for wider ranges of α. We begin with two definitions of the α-entropy.
Definition 4 (Rényi α-entropy [52] ). We define the α-entropy by means of the sandwiched Rényi divergence,
where ρ and σ are positive semidefinite operators on the same Hilbert space. Then, on a bipartite state ρ AB ,
When it is clear from the context we will omit the subscript ρ.
The smooth min-entropy can be then be lower bounded by [21, 53, 54 ]
Additionally, we need to condition upon observing a pass-event Ω on a classical register. The state can be written as ρ = p Ω ρ Ω + (1 − p Ω )ρ Ω ⊥ . The entropy of the conditioned state and unconditioned state can be related by
This result is proven in Lemma B.5 of [21] . We can combine Equation A6 and Equation A7 to obtain
where we have used that α > 1.
Entropy Accumulation
In this section we outline further improvements to the theory of [21, 22] which produce improved rates and make randomness expansion experimentally accessible [55] . We consider a set of channels, [56] . [I(A : B|C) is the conditional mutual information.]
The collection of channels in the above definition represent the sequential interaction with the devices that occurs during the first four steps of the protocol from the main-text. In particular, as the inputs to our devices are chosen independently, the second condition trivially holds for any collection of channels we could use to implement the protocol. Similarly, the nature of the systems imposed by the first condition is also satisfied by any channel implementing our protocol, A i are the outputs for round i, B i are the inputs for round i and X i is the recorded score for round i. We may also view EAT channels as quantum instruments, i.e., for the channel M i there is a collection of trace non-increasing completely positive maps {M ab i } ab with M ab i : S(R i−1 ) → S(R i ) such that for a state ρ ∈ S(R i−1 ) we have Let P denote the set of all probability distributions over the possible outputs of the score register X. Similarly, let Q denote the set of probability distributions over the possible outputs of the score register X that could arise from the application of an EAT channel to some state. Formally, we define
where ρ RR is a joint state of two finite dimensional quantum systems, M is an EAT channel acting on the system R and M(ρ RR ) X denotes the state after applying M and tracing out all systems apart from the score system X.
Lemma 2. The set Q is convex.
Proof. Consider two distributions p, q ∈ Q. To prove convexity we must show that for any λ ∈ (0, 1) we have λp + (1 − λ)q ∈ Q. Let M : S(R) → S(ABXR ) and ρ ∈ S(R) be the EAT-channel and state that achieves the distribution p ∈ Q. Similarly, let N : S(T ) → S(ABXT ) and τ ∈ S(T ) be the EAT-channel and state that achieves the distribution q ∈ Q. Let {M ab } ab and {N ab } ab be the collections of trace non-increasing maps that define the instrument form of M and N respectively (cf. (A8)). Then define the direct sum channel M ⊕ N : S(R ⊕ T ) → S(ABX(R ⊕ T )) by the action
where L 1 and L 3 have the same dimensions as R and T respectively. This is a valid quantum channel if for each pair (a, b), the map
is trace non-increasing and completely positive. The trace non-increasing condition follows from the fact that the maps are individually trace non-increasing, so is positive then so are L 1 and L 3 and hence M ab (L 1 ) and N ab (L 3 ). This channel also satisfies the definition of an EAT channel for the same reasons discussed immediately after Definition 5. Now, applying the direct sum channel to the state λρ ⊕ (1 − λ)τ ∈ S(R ⊕ T ), we have
Now the probability that X = x is given by
On the first line we used that X is a deterministic function of A and B, on the second line we used (A10) to compute the probabilities and the third line follows from the linearity of the trace. As we have defined a valid state and EAT-channel that achieves a distribution λp + (1 − λ)q we must have λp + (1 − λ)q ∈ Q.
Given a distribution q ∈ Q, we can identify the set of states and channels Γ(q) that can achieve q, i.e., for every (ω, M) ∈ Γ(q), the expected distribution generated by M(ω) on the X register is q. In other words,
where R is an arbitrary quantum system and M is an EAT-channel acting on states on R, R is an arbitrary quantum system upon which the channel does not act, it may for instance be a purifying system of the reduced state ω R .
We now define round-by-round lower bounds on the von Neumann entropy, f (q), known as min-tradeoff functions. We refer to affine rate functions as min-tradeoff functions, and for these we reserve the symbol f .
Remark 3. This definition differs slightly from the definitions of min-tradeoff functions in [21, 22] . In these works, min-tradeoff functions are defined with respect to a collection of EAT-channels. In device-independent applications we do not assume to know the collection of channels used during an actual run of the protocol and so if we define our min-tradeoff functions in the same way as [21, 22] then we must show later that our bounds hold for any possible collection of channels compatible with the observed statistics. Here, we instead absorb this infimum over all collections of channels directly into our definition of a min-tradeoff function.
Rate and min-tradeoff functions are lower bounds to the worst-case von Neumann entropy for any individual round, given in terms of the score. Whilst rate functions are only defined on the set Q (the infimum is trivial for distributions not in Q), we allow the domain of the min-tradeoff functions (affine rate functions) to be naturally extended to all probability distributions on X.
The entropy accumulation theorem derives global bounds on the min-entropy in terms of min-tradeoff functions. In the following lemma we show that any tight rate function is convex function on Q.
Lemma 3 (Convexity of optimal rate functions). Let rate opt (q) := inf (ω,M)∈Γ(q) H(A|BR ) M(ω) . Then, rate opt is a convex function on the set Q.
Proof. Let p, q ∈ Q and λ ∈ (0, 1). Now if rate opt (p) = inf (ω RR ,M)∈Γ(q) H(A|BR ) M(ω) then for all > 0 there exists some (ρ RR , M) ∈ Γ(p) such that H(A|BR ) M(ρ RR ) < rate opt (p) + . Similarly, we can find (τ SS , N ) ∈ Γ(q) such that H(A|BS ) N (τ SS ) < rate opt (q) + for some auxiliary quantum systems R and S which need not be the same. Now consider the state λρ ⊕ (1 − λ)τ ∈ S((RR ) ⊕ (SS )) and the channel M ⊕ N : S((RR ) ⊕ (SS )) → S(ABX((R 1 R ) ⊕ (S 1 S ))). We know from the construction in the proof of Lemma 2 that the pair (λρ ⊕ (1 − λ)τ, M ⊕ N ) ∈ Γ(λp + (1 − λ)q), where M and N act trivially on their respective auxiliary systems R and S . We may add an additional 'flag' system F which indicates which part of the direct sum our state is in, i.e., we now extend our state to
Note that by tracing out F we recover the original direct product state. Moreover, as the channel M ⊕ N does not act on F the statistics will not be altered, i.e., (ω, (M ⊕ N ) ⊗ 1 F ) ∈ Γ(λp + (1 − λ)q). Now, by conditioning on the classical information F we may write
where on the second line we have used the fact that conditioned on value of F the state is trivial on RR or SS .
It follows that for all > 0 we have
and so
Then, since H(A|BR S F ) (M⊕N )(ω) ≥ rate opt (λp + (1 − λ)q), we recover the condition for convexity rate opt (λp + (1 − λ)q) ≤ λ rate opt (p) + (1 − λ) rate opt (q) .
In order to use our min-tradeoff functions with the entropy accumulation theorem we require knowledge of several of their properties. Namely, if f is a min-tradeoff function then we define:
• Maximum over all probability distributions:
(A11)
• Minimum over all quantum distributions:
In the final definition, δ x denotes the probability distribution with p(x) = 1. As f is an affine function, the final definition is the statistical variance of the function g(x) = f (δ x ). In [22] Var(f ) is defined to be Var(f ) = sup p∈Q Var p (f ), which gives a worst-case variance over all quantum distributions.
In order to explain our modification to the entropy accumulation theorem we shall reproduce a preliminary step in the proof, beginning Proposition V.3 in [22] . Let f be an affine min-tradeoff function for some set of EAT channels {M i } i . We apply at each round a channel D i : X i → X i D i , which encodes the min-tradeoff function directly. In particular, we define where τ (x) Di is defined so that H α (τ (x) Di ) = Max(f ) − f (δ x ) for some fixed α. We then apply the channels to the state to get ρ ABXDE = D n • · · · • D 1 (ρ ABXE ). In a real protocol, the acceptance of a state will be conditioned upon some success event Ω, determined by the values observed on the X registers (such as a minimal threshold for the CHSH score). Let ρ ABXE|Ω be the state conditioned on passing. It can then be shown that
where h is defined to be inf p∈Ω f (p) (see Equation 33 in [22] ). Then, using Equation A7, we obtain
which relates the bound for the state conditioned on Ω to the unconditioned state. We now seek a lower bound to H α (AD|BE) in terms of the von Neumann entropy. The first step involves using the chain rules of [21, 22] to obtain
From this, we apply a continuity bound relating the von Neumann entropy to the α-entropies which yields
where for CQ states
So far we have not deviated from the argument of [22] , in which they then employ the following simplifications
where Var(f ) = sup p∈Q Var p (f ), and
which is seen by noting that H(
by the definition of the channel D and the min-tradeoff function (where p is assumed to be the distribution on the X i register). These simplifications render the error term 'statistics agnostic', in the sense that Equation A14 becomes
which is independent of the actual statistics observed and this incurs a significant loss of entropy in the regimes of interest to us. Instead, by not taking the supremum in V (f, q) and by permitting a tighter bound to H(A i |B i R) Mi(ω) , we find an improvement. Given a rate function, we can instead use the bounds H(
. Defining ∆(f, p) := rate(p) − f (p), this leads instead to
The presence of the ∆(f, p) term yields a two-fold advantage. Not only is it a positive contribution to the final entropy, but it effectively constrains the probability distribution on the error terms to be close to the actual value of the observed probability distribution. While we still take a worst-case optimisation over distributions, we do it in a way that depends explicitly on the min-tradeoff function so that our optimisation is no longer independent of the actual statistics. By taking min-tradeoff functions that are tangent to some convex rate function, ∆(f, p) will grow to dominate the error terms if q varies too far from the tangent point. To ensure convergence of the minimisation to a globally optimal point and hence a true lower bound in (A15), we show that computing the infimum is a convex optimisation problem.
Lemma 4 (Convexity of the objective). Let f be a min-tradeoff function, rate be a convex rate function and α ∈ (1, 2) . Then,
is a convex optimisation problem.
Proof. We note that the domain of the optimisation is Q which is a convex set (see Lemma 2). The first term ∆(f, p) = rate(p) − f (p) is convex since rate(p) is convex and f (p) is affine. The second term can be written as V (f, p) = c(d + 2 + Var p (f )) 2 where c and d are positive constants. We note that Var p (f ) is the variance of the function g(x) = f (δ x ). Variance is concave in the probability distribution and the square root is an increasing concave function, hence 2 + Var p (f ) is concave. Expanding c(d + 2 + Var p (f )) 2 we find that it is a non-negatively weighted sum of concave functions, hence also concave. This implies that −(α − 1)V (f, p) is convex. Lastly, K α does not depend on p and is hence a constant term. Overall, we find that the objective function is a non-negatively weighted sum of functions that are convex in p and hence is itself a convex function. Finally, minimising a convex function over a convex set is a convex optimisation problem.
Infrequent sampling and the CHSH game
The spot-checking format of the protocol enforces a particular structure in the probabilities distributions over the score register that can be produced by the protocol. In particular, the expected distributions over X i for each round i must take the form
where q is a distribution over the test-round scores for round i. That is, each p ∈ Q follows this structure if we perform spot-checking. To capture this structure in the construction of our min-tradeoff functions we follow [22, Section 5] , by first defining a min-tradeoff function that only takes the statistics of a test round and then extending the domain of the function to include the no-test symbol ⊥. Formally, we define infrequent sampling channels as follows.
Definition 8 (Infrequent sampling channel). An infrequent sampling channel, M i :
Thus, on round i the channel M gen i occurs with probability 1 − γ and this event is recorded with ⊥ in the X i register and otherwise a test channel acts with the score is written to the X i register. We define the set of test round distributions Q test as
where M is an infrequent sampling channel. Let g be an affine function satisfying
for all q ∈ Q test . Then for c ⊥ ∈ R, the function
is a min-tradeoff function for the spot checking protocol (in [22] , the authors set c ⊥ = Max(g)). To show this, we note that because of the structure of infrequent sampling channels (cf. (A17)), for any p ∈ Q there exists a q ∈ Q test such that p(x) = γq(x) for x =⊥ and p(⊥) = 1 − γ. For p ∈ Q, we then have
As g(q) is defined as a lower bound on the von Neumann entropy (A20), f (p) must also be and hence is a min-tradeoff function. We obtain expressions for V (f, p) and K α (f ) by noting that
The first property is by definition Max(f ). The second property Min Q (f ) follows from the fact that for any p ∈ Q we have that f (p) = g(q) for some q ∈ Q test . For Var p (f ), we explicitly calculate
where we have used that f (q) = g(q) and substituted the explicit forms of p(x) and f (δ ⊥ ). We can expand the term in the sum
Inserting the final line into the formula for Var p (f ) we can rearrange the expression to get
As the final term is strictly negative we arrive at the desired result. We wish to apply this to a rate function for the CHSH game. In the CHSH game we have a binary score, i.e., X ∈ {0, 1} for test rounds. For quantum systems the probability of winning (scoring one) is bounded by q ∈ 1/2 − √ 2/4, 1/2 + √ 2/4 . A rate function in terms of the CHSH score (without spot-checking) was first derived in [57] , and has been applied previously in the context of device-independent cryptography [4] . This rate function, which plays the role of g(q) above, is defined as
is the binary Shannon entropy. We note that the rate function is undefined for winning probabilities that are not quantum-achievable. It also only takes into account the randomness obtained from one of Alice's devices and does not consider the full measurement statistics, so one could hope to gain more entropy if both parties outputs are taken into account. As rate CHSH is a convex function, we can obtain a family of min-tradeoff functions by taking the tangent to this rate function at any point t ∈ 1/2 − √ 2/4, 1/2 + √ 2/4 . Denoting these functions by g t , we have
where the prime indicates the derivative. As these functions are affine we can uniquely extend their domains to include all q ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we can define our min-tradeoff function as
with g(δ 0 ) = 0. Note that due to the spot checking structure, for a fixed γ ∈ (0, 1), rate CHSH also defines a rate function on Q via rate(p) = rate CHSH (q). Recall also that we have a freedom to choose both the tangent point t and the value of c ⊥ , we shall later optimize over these values. The family of functions f t can then be applied to the entropy accumulation theorem. Before stating the main theorem, we revert back to some of the original notation of the main text. We note that A refers to the outputs of Alice's devices B refers to the inputs, and X the register that records scores and round-type. Thus, for consistency with the main body, in the theorem below we make the substitutions, A → AB, B → XY and X → U. 
where
In the above theorem, the argument of rate CHSH (q) is the unique distribution q ∈ Q test such that p(x) = γq(x) for x =⊥. Note that we can optimize the above bound by taking the supremum over c ⊥ , t and α. Once a lower bound for the smooth min-entropy has been obtained, a randomness extraction procedure ensures that the security definitions are satisfied.
We define the single photon heralding efficiency as η A = C/N B and η B = C/N A for Alice and Bob, in which two-photon coincidence events C and single photon detection events for Alice N A and Bob N B are measured in the experiment. The heralding efficiency is listed in Tab. I, where η sc is the efficiency of coupling entangled photons into single mode optical fibre, η so the optical efficiency due to limited transmittance of optical elements in the source, η fibre the transmittance of fibre linking source to measurement station, η m the efficiency for light passing through the measurement station, and η det the single photon detector efficiency. The heralding efficiency and the transmittance of individual optical elements are listed in Tab. I, where η so , η fibre , η m , η det can be measured with classical light beams and NIST-traceable power meters. ) for maximum coincidence, where the angles represent measurement basis cos(θ) |H + sin(θ) |V for Alice and Bob. By setting the mean photon number to µ = 0.0023 to suppress the multi-photon effect, we measure the visibility to be 99.4% and 98.5% in horizontal/vertical basis and diagonal/anti-diagonal basis.
We perform quantum state tomography measurement of the non-maximally entangled state, with result shown in Fig. 5 . The state fidelity is 99.10%. We attribute the imperfection to multi-photon components, imperfect optical elements, and imperfect spatial/spectral mode matching.
Spacetime configuration of the experiment
To close the locality loophole in test rounds, space-like separation must be satisfied between relevant events at Alice and Bob's measurement stations: the state measurement events by Alice and Bob, measurement event at one station and the setting choice event at the other station ( Fig. 6 ). We then obtain
where |SA| = 93 m (|SB| = 90 m) is the free space distance between entanglement source and Alice's (Bob's) measurement station, T E = 10 ns is the generation time for entangled photon pairs, which is mainly contributed by the 10 ns pump pulse duration, L SA = 191 m (L SB = 173.5 m) is the effective optical path which is mainly contributed by the long fibre (130 m, 118 m) between source and Alice/Bob's measurement station, T A QRNG = T B QRNG = 96 ns is the time elapse for QRNG to generate a random bit, T A Delay = 270 ns (T B Delay = 230 ns) is the delay between QRNG and Pockels cells, T A PC = 112 ns (T B PC = 100 ns) including the internal delay of the Pockels Cells (62 ns, 50 ns) and the time for Pockels cell to stabilize before performing single photon polarization state projection after switching which is 50 ns, which implies that the experimental time is able to be shortened by increasing the repetition rate of the experiment because the low testing The measurement independence requirement is satisfied by space-like separation between entangled-pair creation event and setting choice events, so we can have
As shown in Fig. 6 , Alice's and Bob's random bit generation events for input setting choices are outside the future light cone (green shade) of entanglement creation event at the source.
Appendix C: Parameter determination and Experimental Results
Parameter determination
The implementation of the protocol depends on several parameters which we can choose in advance. Firstly, we pre-determine the testing probability γ based on a 10 minute-Bell test at a repetition frequency of 200 KHz. The counts are summarized in Tab. II. With ω exp = 0.750809, the optimal testing probability γ opt is basically independent of soundness error S and completeness error C as shown in Tab. III. The amount of randomness expansion we achieve depends on the testing probability, γ. In Fig. 7 we show this behaviour, indicating the value chosen in our experiment (γ = 1.194 × 10 −4 ). Although this was chosen slightly sub-optimally, it is sufficient for our purposes.
With ω exp = 0.750809 and choose the soundness and completeness errors to be S = 5.74 × 10 −8 and C = 1 × 10 −6 , randomness expansion is expected to be witnessed within 200 hours. To ensure success we run the experiment for slightly longer than this (220 hours), corresponding to 3.168 × 10 12 rounds. In Table IV we show how the amount of randomness would vary by adjusting the completeness and soundness errors. TABLE II. Counts of training rounds. Recorded number of two-photon detection events for four sets of polarization state measurement bases x = 0 or 1 indicates "0−" or "1/2−" wave voltages for Pockels cell respectively and a = 1 or 0 indicates that Alice detects a photon or not, the same applies for y and b on Bob's side. The CHSH score is 0.750809.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11 xy = 00 29172431 214574 181730 422697 xy = 01 28732552 654944 134767 471554 xy = 10 28711770 154239 637085 483897 xy = 11 27868246 1043044 1033950 82496
Experimental results
The recorded experimental data are listed in Table V . We assign 1 for a detection event and 0 for no detection. The CHSH score ω CHSH as given by ω CHSH = k,l n x i y i =kl i=1 (1 + (−1) ai⊕bi⊕(xi·yi) )/n xiyi=kl , Rate of expansion randomness (bits per round) 10 -4 expansion rate with n = n min expansion rate with n = n act threshold our result FIG. 7. Expansion rate versus the value of γ. With a fixed number of rounds and ωexp = 0.750809, the expansion rate changes slowly around the optimal value of γ (fixing the other parameters to those used in the protocol). The yellow dashed line is the threshold to witness expansion. The blue and orange smooth lines represent the expansion rate with expected number of rounds nmin = 2.91×10 12 and actual number of rounds nact = 3.168×10 12 , respectively. The black plus stands for the value of γ = 1.194 × 10 −4 used in our experiment.
TABLE IV. Values of the net output that our experiment would achieve with varying completeness and soundness errors. '-' represents that the consumed randomness surpasses the amount generated. C S 10 −3 10 −4 10 −5 10 −6 10 −7 10 −8 10 −9 10 −3 3.15 × 10 9 2.73 × 10 9 2.36 × 10 9 2.01 × 10 9 1.70 × 10 9 1.40 × 10 9 1.12 × 10 9 10 −4 2.64 × 10 9 2.22 × 10 9 1.84 × 10 9 1.50 × 10 9 1.18 × 10 9 8.85 × 10 8 6.06 × 10 8 10 −5 2.19 × 10 9 1.77 × 10 9 1.40 × 10 9 1.05 × 10 9 7.36 × 10 8 4.39 × 10 8 1.60 × 10 8 10 −6 1.79 × 10 9 1.37 × 10 9 9.97 × 10 8 6.54 × 10 8 3.37 × 10 8 4.04 × 10 7 -10 −7 1.43 × 10 9 1.01 × 10 9 6.33 × 10 8 ----10 −8 1.09 × 10 9 6.72 × 10 8 2.96 × 10 8 ----10 −9 7.78 × 10 8 3.57 × 10 8 -----with (k, l) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) is computed to be 0.750805. After applying a 6.496 Gb ×3.17 Tb Toeplitz matrix hashing, we obtain 6.496×10 9 genuinely quantum-certified random bits with a uniformity within 5.74×10 −8 , which is equivalent to 2.63 × 10 8 net bits after subtracting the randomness consumed. The stream of random bits pass the NIST statistical test suite (see Tab. VI for details). We have made the final random output available at https://tinyurl.com/qssxxaq so that it may be used for testing (the output has been split between several files for convenience of downloading). TABLE V. Counts of experimental rounds. Recorded number of two-photon detection events for four sets of polarization state measurement bases x = 0 or 1 indicates "0−" or "1/2−" wave voltages for Pockels cell respectively and a = 1 or 0 indicates that Alice detects a photon or not, the same applies for y and b on Bob's side. The CHSH score is 0.750805.
Basis settings ab = 00 ab = 10 ab = 01 ab = 11 To check the statistical properties of our output, we run it through the NIST test suite [58] . To do so, we set the section length to 1 Mbits for our 6.496 × 10 9 random output bits. As shown in Tab. VI, the random bits successfully pass the tests. 
